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Abstract  
 
The Savannah River Site of Department of Energy will use the new Modular Caustic Side 
Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU) to process the waste stream by removing/reducing Cs-137 using 
Caustic Side Solvent Extraction (CSSX) technology. The CSSX technology utilizes multi-
component organic solvent and annular centrifugal contactors to extract Cs-137 from waste salt 
solution.  Due to the radiolysis of the aqueous nuclear wastes, hydrogen generation is expected 
in the MCU holding tanks. The hydrogen from radiolysis and the vapor from the organic 
component of the solvent, Isopar-L, may form a composite flammable gas mixture, resulting in a 
shorter time to flammability than that of a pure hydrogen environment.  It has been found that 
the time-to-Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) and stoichiometric concentration (SC) vary greatly 
from tank to tank, and could be decreased significantly by the presence of the Isopar-L.  
However, neither the deflagration nor the detonation event would challenge the Evaluation 
Guideline for any of the tanks at any liquid level. 
 
Introduction 
 
The MCU is part of the process used for disposal of liquid waste at the Department of Energy 
Savannah River Site (SRS). The MCU will process the waste stream by removing Cs-137 from 
the salt solution in preparation for final disposal in grouted vaults using CSSX technology [1]. 
The CSSX technology utilizes multi-component organic solvent and annular centrifugal 
contactors to extract Cs-137 from salt waste.  In the CSSX process, salt waste is mixed in 
centrifugal contactors with organic solvent containing Isopar L.  The contactors then separate the 
majority of the cesium-laden solvent from the aqueous solution.  Coalescers and decanters 
process the aqueous Decontaminated Salt Solution (DSS) and Strip Effluent (SE) solutions to 
allow recovery and reuse of the residual organic solvent remaining in the aqueous solution, and 
to limit the quantity of solvent available to be transferred to the downstream facilities. 
 
Due to the radiolysis of the aqueous nuclear wastes, hydrogen generation is expected in the 
MCU holding tanks. In the event of a loss of ventilation, it is possible for the hydrogen to 
accumulate in the vapor space of a holding tank. With the possible presence of the organic 
solvent (i.e., Isopar-L), the hydrogen and the vapor of the solvent form a composite flammable 
gas mixture, resulting in a shorter time to flammability than that of a pure hydrogen 
environment.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to present the methodology used to evaluate the times-to-Lower 
Flammability Limit (LFL) and stoichiometric concentration (SC) and the consequences as a 
result of hydrogen deflagration and, possibly, detonation in the MCU holding tanks. This paper 
also examines the effect of the organic solvent Isopar-L used in the process on the flammability 
and consequences. 
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Description of the Tanks and Input Data  
 
The holding and process tanks considered in this analysis are the Strip Effluent Hold Tank 
(SEHT), Salt Solution Receipt Tank (SSRT), and Strip Effluent Decanter (SED).  These tanks 
are cylindrical tanks with elliptical heads lying on their longitudinal axis.  Some of the key 
parameters are listed in Table 1.  The overflow lines establish the minimum volumes for 
flammable vapor accumulation.  There are additional small cylinders (referred to as “ports”) on 
the tank tops to accommodate the mounting of level control pumps and level instrumentations.   
 
The SED receives aqueous flow with concentrated cesium containing residual solvent that is not 
completely separated in the centrifugal contactors into the “Large side” of the tank.  An 
underflow weir allows the heavier aqueous solution to pass through to the “Small side” of the 
tank while retaining the lighter solvent at the liquid surface in the Large side of the tank.  
Generally, the level in the Large side is at its maximum (i.e. inside the pump port) thus filling the 
space between the two weirs with liquid.   The aqueous solution, minus the solvent then flows 
over an overflow weir and is pumped out to the SEHT.  The SED is depicted in Figure 1; the 
SSRT and SEHT are similar in design but do not contain underflow and overflow weirs and are 
not generally maintained at nearly full volume. 
 
 
Figure 1   SED Schematic 
 
Table 1   Key Tank Parameters 
Parameter SEHT SSRT SED 
Cylinder length 9 ft 9 in 19 ft 6 in 6 ft 
Diameter 4 ft 4 in 8 ft  3 ft  
Number of elliptical heads 2 2 2 
Height of head 13 in 25.5 in 12 in 
Overflow line position (from top of tank) 6 in 6 in 3 in 
Waste stream Strip Effluent MCU Feed Strip Effluent 
(Upset) 
Hydrogen generation rate @ 50°C (ft3/hr-gal) 1.53 × 10-5  6.29 × 10-7  6.80 × 10-5  
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The radiological dose resulting from an accident is determined by the radionuclide 
concentrations (Ci/gal) in the tanks and the Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) unit dose 
(rem/Ci).  In this analysis, the TEDE unit doses are evaluated by the atmospheric dispersion code 
MACCS-2 [2] with the Savannah River Site (SRS) specific meteorological data and a 3-minute 
ground level release duration.  The TEDEs are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 TEDEs for 3-Minute Ground Release 
Dose (rem/gal) 
Waste Stream 100m Onsite H-Area Offsite 
Strip Effluent (Normal Process) 1.35E-01 1.74E-04 
Strip Effluent (Upset Process) 4.65E-01 5.78E-04 
MCU Feed 4.58E-02 6.45E-05 
 
Deflagration and Detonation Models  
 
In a tank with its vapor space filled with hydrogen, the energy of combustion is calculated by the 
product of the number of moles of the hydrogen and its molar combustion energy; i.e.,  
  HHH NE ε=  ,        (1) 
where ∈H is the molar combustion energy of hydrogen (= 57.8 x 103 cal/mole or 242 kJ/mole) 
and NH is the total number of moles of hydrogen, which can be calculated by the Ideal Gas Law: 
 TR
VPCN VHH =  ,        (2) 
where   
CH  = hydrogen concentration (in volume or mole fraction) 
P = Pressure (Pa) 
VV  = Vapor volume (m3) 
R  = Universal Gas Constant (8.3143 J/mole-K) 
T = temperature (K). 
 
The time to Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) is calculated by dividing the volume of hydrogen 
at LFL in the tank by the hydrogen generation rate; i.e.,  
   
G
VC
G
Vt totalVLFLHLFL −== ,      (3) 
where tLFL is the time to LFL, CLFL is the LFL concentration of hydrogen (4%), and G is the 
hydrogen generation rate, which is given by: 
           (4) totalLVgG −′=
where g’ is the volumetric hydrogen generation rate of the liquid waste (in ft3/hr-gal). Equation 3 
can be also used to determine the time to stoichiometric concentration if the LFL concentration 
is replaced by the stoichiometric concentration of 29.5%. 
 
If the hydrogen concentration is greater than or equal to the LFL value, this analysis postulates 
that deflagration will occur.  No correction to the LFL is used because a low temperature of 25°C 
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is assumed to maximize the number of moles of hydrogen.  The resultant dose from the 
deflagration is dependent on the vaporization source term which is given by: 
RFARF
galccgkgh
EF
ST
sfg
H
d *)/3785()1000/1(
×= ρ ,  (in gal) (5) 
where  
EH = combustion energy (kJ) 
hfg = evaporation energy of water (kJ/kg), 
ρ s       = density of liquid waste (g/cc), conservatively assumed to be 1. 
 
and F is the fraction of the combustion energy that is deposited into the liquid surface, which is 
equal to the ratio of the liquid surface area and the total surface areas “seen” by the flame.  This 
analysis conservatively sets F to be 1/2.  For the ARF*RF value, DOE Handbook [4] 
recommends a bounding ARF of 0.1 for venting of superheated liquids with 50-100°C of 
superheating.  The physical mechanisms involved in entrainment by vapor created from surface 
boiling due to radiant energy deposition (i.e., deflagration) are not exactly the same as those for 
entrainment of steam created within a volume of liquid, and hence fewer droplets would be 
created.  As a result, it is judged that an ARF value of 0.1 is reasonable and conservative.  For 
deflagration source term calculation, Damage Ratio (DF) and Leak Path Factor (LPF) are set to 
one. 
 
If the concentration of the hydrogen exceeds the maximum stoichiometric concentration 
(29.5%), the present analysis uses the TNT model [4] to evaluate the detonation effect. In this 
model, the mass of liquid (source term) made airborne by the detonation is set equal to the mass 
of TNT that produces the same energy; i.e., 
)/3785()/()/(
)(
galccccggJ
JEST
sTNT
H
TNT ρε= ,  (in gal)  (6) 
where ∈TNT is the specific TNT energy which is 4,606 J/g (or 1.1 kcal/g) and ρs is the density of 
the liquid waste.  Again, this analysis conservatively uses the water density (1 g/cc) for all 
detonations. Using the TNT model implies that DR, ARF, RF and LPF are all set to one. 
 
The vapor volume in the source term calculation is the tank volume above the liquid level.  For 
the SED, the Large Side and Small Side are treated separately for the time to LFL/SC calculation 
and are therefore dependent on the liquid level on either side.  The level in the Small Side cannot 
rise above the overflow line.  The level in the Large Side can rise to a maximum level inside the 
pump port. 
 
For dose calculations, the Large and Small Side vapor spaces are lumped together to be treated 
as the vapor space for the Large Side (which bounds the dose from the Small Side).  The Large 
Side vapor volume is level dependent.  The Small Side is assumed to be empty (including the 
space between the weirs) thus maximizing the vapor volume and hydrogen content.  This is 
conservative for dose calculations.   
 
Once the source terms are determined, the deflagration and detonation doses can be readily 
obtained by multiplying the source term (in gal) with the appropriate TEDEs.  
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Effects of Isopar-L on Flammability  
 
This analysis considers the effects of Isopar-L in the SSRT, SED, and SEHT.  Note that Isopar-L 
is expected to be present in the SED but little is expected to be present in the SSRT or SEHT.  
Since Isopar-L itself is combustible, its presence could change the composition of the 
combustible gases in the vapor space of the SEHT, SSRT or SED.  The vapor pressure of Isopar-
L increases with temperature. This analysis assumes the tanks are initially at 50°C.  The vapor 
pressure of Isopar-L is approximately 4 mm Hg or about 0.53% [5]. 
 
For a mixture of Isopar-L and hydrogen, the Composite Lower Flammability Limit (CLFL) can 
be calculated by using the Le-Chatelier’s Law [6]; i.e., 
I
I
H
H
LFL
f
LFL
f
CLFL
+
= 1        (7) 
where   fH  = fraction of hydrogen in fuel 
fI  = fraction of Isopar-L in fuel  
LFLH = LFL of hydrogen = 4%  [6] 
LFLI = LFL of Isopar-L = 0.6%  [7] 
 
With the Isopar-L concentration at 0.53%, it can be shown that the fuel concentration exceeds 
the CLFL when the hydrogen concentration is 0.48% [9].  
 
Since time-to-deflagration is directly proportional to the hydrogen concentration, the ratio of 
time-to-deflagration of the Isopar-L/hydrogen mixture to that of pure hydrogen is: 
  12.0
4
48.0 ==
LFL
f
t
t
        (8) 
This means that the presence of Isopar-L leads to a reduction of 88% in time to deflagration. The 
ratio of combustion energy resulting from the deflagration of the Isopar-L/hydrogen mixture to 
that of pure hydrogen is: 
  
HH
IIHH
H
mix
n
nn
E
E
ε
εε ′+′=  ,       (9) 
where                = hydrogen concentration at LFL = 4 volume% Hn
Hn′  and = hydrogen and Isopar-L concentrations at CLFL, respectively. In′
εH          = hydrogen heat of combustion = 242 kJ/mole  [6] 
εI           = Isopar-L heat of combustion = 8,061 kJ/mole  [8] 
Since the gas concentration is directly proportional to the number of moles, it can be shown that 
the combustion energy, and the subsequent consequences, resulting from the deflagration of the 
Isopar-L/hydrogen mixture at CLFL is 4.5 times of that of the pure hydrogen at LFL [9].  
 
It has been determined that the volume percent of Isopar-L in a stoichiometric mixture with air is 
1.22% [8].  The oxygen left after an stoichiometric combustion is zero.  At 50°C, the Isopar-L 
concentration is 0.53% volume.  The amount of oxygen consumed is approximately 9.1% (i.e., 
21 × 0.53 / 1.22) and the amount of oxygen left is 11.9%.  In a stoichiometric pure hydrogen-air 
mixture, the hydrogen concentration is 29.5% volume.  For a mixture with 11.9% oxygen, the 
WSRC-STI-2007-00080
   6   
stoichiometric hydrogen concentration is approximately 16.7% (i.e. 29.5 x 11.9 / 21).  Therefore, 
the time to fill this space with hydrogen is  
  57.0
5.29
7.16
)(
)(
2
2 ==+
Ht
HIsopart
      (10) 
or 57% of the time to fill it with 29.5% hydrogen.  In terms of energy generated by detonation, 
the ratio of energy from an Isopar/hydrogen/air mixture at 50°C to that from a stoichiometric 
hydrogen/air mixture can be evaluated in a fashion similar to Equation 9.  However, it is 
conservative to assume the Isopar-L is at its stoichiometric concentration (i.e. 1.22%).  The 
energy ratio is therefore  
  38.1
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where  nI*   = Isopar-L stoichiometric concentration = 1.22 volume% 
  nH*  = hydrogen stoichiometric concentration = 29.5 volume% 
which is used to “correct” the energy generated by the detonation of a pure hydrogen-air 
mixture. 
 
Results of Analysis 
 
A summary of the calculation for pure hydrogen-air mixtures is given in the following Tables 3 
to 5.  The maximum liquid levels are established by the overflow lines except for the SED Large 
Side which is the normal operating level inside the pump port.  The effects of Isopar-L is 
summarized in Tables 6 to 8.   
 
Table 3   Calculation Results for Hydrogen-Air Mixture in SEHT 
Level Time to LFL Dose (rem) Time to SC Dose (rem) 
(inches) (hours) Onsite Offsite (hours) Onsite Offsite 
2 2.98E+04 1.45E-03 1.86E-06 2.20E+05 1.05E-01 1.35E-04 
6 5.41E+03 1.38E-03 1.77E-06 3.99E+04 9.94E-02 1.28E-04 
12 1.71E+03 1.22E-03 1.56E-06 1.26E+04 8.79E-02 1.13E-04 
18 8.03E+02 1.02E-03 1.31E-06 5.92E+03 7.37E-02 9.49E-05 
24 4.27E+02 8.05E-04 1.04E-06 3.15E+03 5.82E-02 7.49E-05 
30 2.33E+02 5.86E-04 7.54E-07 1.72E+03 4.23E-02 5.45E-05 
36 1.21E+02 3.76E-04 4.83E-07 8.90E+02 2.72E-02 3.49E-05 
40 7.13E+01 2.48E-04 3.19E-07 5.26E+02 1.79E-02 2.31E-05 
44 3.59E+01 1.36E-04 1.75E-07 2.65E+02 9.85E-03 1.27E-05 
Overflow is at 43 inches. 
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Table 4   Calculation Results for Hydrogen-Air Mixture in SSRT 
Level Time to LFL Dose (rem) Time to SC Dose (rem) 
 (hours) Onsite Offsite (hours) Onsite Offsite 
2 1.84E+06 3.35E-03 4.73E-06 1.36E+07 2.42E-01 3.42E-04 
10 1.55E+05 3.19E-03 4.50E-06 1.14E+06 2.31E-01 3.25E-04 
20 4.97E+04 2.88E-03 4.05E-06 3.67E+05 2.08E-01 2.93E-04 
40 1.32E+04 2.05E-03 2.89E-06 9.73E+04 1.48E-01 2.09E-04 
60 4.36E+03 1.14E-03 1.61E-06 3.22E+04 8.26E-02 1.16E-04 
80 9.97E+02 3.53E-04 4.98E-07 7.35E+03 2.56E-02 3.60E-05 
88 3.28E+02 1.25E-04 1.76E-07 2.42E+03 9.03E-03 1.27E-05 
Overflow is at 87 inches. 
 
Table 5   Calculation Results for Hydrogen-Air Mixture in SED 
Level Time to LFL (hrs) Dose (rem) Time to SC (hrs) Dose (rem) 
(inches
) 
Large side Small side Onsite Offsite Large side Small side Onsite Offsite 
2 4.07E+03 2.51E+02 1.66E-03 2.06E-06 2.30E+04 1.85E+03 1.20E-01 1.49E-04 
6 7.15E+02 1.69E+02 1.57E-03 1.95E-06 5.27E+03 1.25E+03 1.14E-01 1.41E-04 
10 2.96E+02 1.22E+02 1.46E-03 1.81E-06 2.18E+03 8.28E+02 1.05E-01 1.31E-04 
14 1.54E+02 7.37E+01 1.32E-03 1.64E-06 1.14E+03 5.43E+02 9.53E-02 1.18E-04 
18 8.71E+01 4.70E+01 1.17E-03 1.46E-06 6.43E+02 3.47E+02 8.49E-02 1.05E-04 
22 5.01E+01 2.85E+01 1.03E-03 1.28E-06 3.70E+02 2.10E+02 7.44E-02 9.25E-05 
26 2.78E+01 1.57E+01 8.94E-04 1.11E-06 2.05E+02 1.15E+02 6.46E-02 8.02E-05 
32 9.25E+00 3.94E+00 7.28E-04 9.05E-07 6.82E+01 2.91E+01 5.27E-02 6.54E-05 
36 4.24E+00 NA 6.71E-04 8.34E-07 3.13E+01 NA 4.85E-02 6.03E-05 
48 1.70E+00 NA 6.39E-04 7.94E-07 1.25E+01 NA 4.62E-02 5.74E-05 
Maximum level is 40 inches for the Large side and 33 inches for the Small side 
 
Table 6  Effect of Isopar-L on SEHT 
H2 Only H2 and Isopar-L   
100m Onsite  H-Area Offsite 100m Onsite H-Area Offsite 
Time to Deflagration (for max 
dose)  (hr) 2.98E+04 3.58E+03 
Maximum Deflagration 
Dose  (rem) 1.45E-03 1.86E-06 6.53E-03 8.37E-06 
Minimum Time to Deflagration 
(level at overflow line)  (hr)  44.0 5.28 
Deflagration Dose (at min time)  
(rem)  1.63E-04 2.10E-07 7.34E-04 9.43E-07 
Time to Detonation (for max 
dose)  (hr) 2.20E+05 1.25E+05 
Maximum Detonation Dose 
(rem) 1.05E-01 1.35E-04 1.44E-01** 1.85E-04** 
Minimum Time to Detonation 
(level at overflow line)  (hr)  324 185 
Detonation Dose (at min time)  
(rem)  1.18E-02 1.52E-05 1.61E-02** 2.08E-05** 
** Stoichiometric Isopar-L only. 
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Table 7  Effect of Isopar-L on SSRT 
H2 Only H2 and Isopar-L   
100m Onsite  H-Area Offsite 100m Onsite H-Area Offsite
Time to Deflagration (for max 
dose)  (hr) 1.843E+06 2.21E+05 
Maximum Deflagration 
Dose (rem) 3.35E-03 4.73E-06 1.51E-02 2.13E-05 
Minimum Time to Deflagration 
(level at overflow line)  (hr) 3.97E+02 4.76E+01 
Deflagration Dose (at min time)  
(rem) 1.50E-04 2.12E-07 6.75E-04 9.54E-07 
Time to Detonation (max) 
(hr) 1.360E+07 7.75E+06 
Maximum Detonation Dose 
(rem) 2.42E-01 3.42E-04 3.32E-01** 4.69E-04** 
Minimum Time to Detonation 
(level at overflow line)  (hr) 2.93E+03 1.67E+03 
Detonation Dose (at min time)  
(rem)  1.09E-02 1.53E-05 1.49E-02** 2.09E-05** 
** Stoichiometric Isopar-L only. 
 
Table 8  Effect of Isopar-L on SED 
H2 Only H2 and Isopar-L   
100m Onsite  H-Area Offsite 100m Onsite H-Area Offsite
Time to Deflagration (max dose)  
(hr) 2.51E+02 3.01E+01 
Maximum Deflagration 
Dose  (rem) 1.66E-03 2.06E-06 7.47E-03 9.27E-06 
Minimum Time to Deflagration 
(max level in pump port)  (hr) 1.70 0.20 
Deflagration Dose (at min time)  
(rem) 6.39E-04 7.94E-07 2.86E-03 3.57E-06 
Time to Detonation (max dose) 
(hr) 1.85E+03 1.06E+03 
Maximum Detonation Dose 
(rem) 1.20E-01 1.49E-04 1.64E-01** 2.04E-04** 
Minimum Time to Detonation 
(max level in pump port)  (hr) 12.5 7.13 
Detonation Dose (at min time)  
(rem)  4.62E-02 5.74E-05 6.33E-02** 7.86E-05** 
** Stoichiometric Isopar-L only. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Based on the results of this analysis, it can be seen that SED and SSRT respectively have the 
shortest and longest times to flammability.  Depending on the temperature, the presence of the 
Isopar-L can significantly further decrease the time to deflagration or detonation.  For 
radiological consequences, neither the deflagration nor detonation event results in doses that 
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exceed or challenge the Evaluation Guideline (100 rem onsite, 25 rem offsite) for any one of the 
tanks at any liquid level. 
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